Implied Easements in the North Carolina Courts: An Essay on the Meaning of Necessary by Glenn, Peter G.
Penn State Dickinson Law 
Dickinson Law IDEAS 
Faculty Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
1-1-1980 
Implied Easements in the North Carolina Courts: An Essay on the 
Meaning of Necessary 
Peter G. Glenn 
pgg1@psu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/fac-works 
Recommended Citation 
Peter G. Glenn, Implied Easements in the North Carolina Courts: An Essay on the Meaning of Necessary, 
58 N.C. L. Rev. 223 (1980). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For 
more information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
IMPLIED EASEMENTS IN THE NORTH
CAROLINA COURTS: AN ESSAY ON THE
MEANING OF "NECESSARY"
PETER G. GLENNt
In this Article, Professor Glenn focuses on distinctions be-
tween the two major types of implied easements-the easement
by necessity and the quasi-easement or easement impliedfrom
prior use. Spec fcally, Professor Glenn argues that the "neces-
sity" requirement for each type of implied easement must be
carefully distinguished 4 survey of the North Carolina implied
easement cases reveals, however, that such a distinction appar-
ently has not been articulated in the opinions and that dicta sug-
gests that the distinction is not recognized in this state. In an
effort to clariy' the North Carolina law on thispoint, Professor
Glenn suggests an analytic framework to be used in implied
easement cases.
The law generally requires that easements, like other interests in
land, be created in writing.' Sometimes, however, owners transfer land
without documenting useful or necessary easements. The circum-
" Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A.
1965, Middlebury College; J.D. 1968, University of Pennsylvania.
My interest in the North Carolina implied easement cases was stimulated by my work, in
1978, as draftsman for the Civil Subcommittee of the North Carolina Conference of Superior
Court Judges Pattern Jury Instruction Committee. The Subcommittee, then chaired by Judge
Henry A. McKinnon, Jr., drafted pattern jury instructions for use in cases in which an easement
by implication or a "way of necessity" is claimed. Those instructions were made available for use
by North Carolina judges. NORTH CAROLINA CONFERENCE OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES, COM-
MITTEE ON PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
CIVIL CASES §§ 840.20-.25 (Supp. 1979).
Neither Judge McKinnon nor any other member of the Committee bears responsibility for
the opinions expressed in this Article. Judge McKinnon and his colleagues are, however, respon-
sible for reteaching me the importance of stating legal rules with sufficient clarity, simplicity and
precision to enable a jury to apply the law properly to the evidence. This lesson, which bears
repetition for law teachers and appellate judges, is one of the many reasons I am grateful to have
had the opportunity to work with the Pattern Jury Instruction Committee.
In earlier form this article was reviewed and criticized by my colleagues, Denis J. Brion,
Lewis H. LaRue and Roger D. Groot. I am grateful for their comments and suggestions.
1. J. WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 278, at 345 (1971); 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.20, at 244-45 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). See generally Conard, Easements,
Licenses and the Statutes of Frauds, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 222 (1941).
North Carolina cases on this point include: Shingleton v. State, 260 N.C. 451, 133 S.E.2d 183
(1963); Borders v. Yarbrough, 237 N.C. 540, 75 S.E.2d 541 (1953); Prentice v. Roberts, 32 N.C.
App. 379, 232 S.E.2d 286 (1977); Simmons v. Morton, 1 N.C. App. 308, 161 S.E.2d 222 (1968).
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stances of some of these transactions suggest that the parties probably
intended to create an easement. If the writing requirement were ap-
plied to deny legal recognition to these easements, reasonable, and
probably intended, land uses would be impeded by the expense and
difficulty of finding alternatives for the easements. Judges have re-
garded these consequences as unacceptable and have, therefore, ap-
plied rules permitting the implication of undocumented easements
from some circumstances of land transactions.
Easements are implied in two basic situations. In the first, the im-
plication is based on findings that the claimed easement is "necessary"
to the enjoyment of claimant's land and that the necessity arose when
the claimed dominant parcel was severed from common ownership
with the claimed servient parcel. Typically, of course, this involves
land that became landlocked as a result of a sale or transfer. In the
literature and opinions this type of implied easement is called the
"easement by necessity."2
In the second situation, the easement is implied to protect the
probable expectations of the grantor and grantee that an existing use of
part of the land would continue after the transfer. A typical situation
giving rise to this type of implication begins with a landowner who
builds and uses a driveway from the public road. Later he sells a por-
tion of the land served by the driveway but retains title to the driveway
itself. The purchaser, who knew of the driveway at the time of the
transfer, may have reasonably assumed that the driveway would con-
tinue to serve his land, regardless of whether his land had some other
access to the public road. Easements of this type often are described in
the treatises and opinions as easements implied from a "quasi-ease-
ment"3 ; the phrase "quasi-easement" denotes the prior use by the origi-
nal owner.' In this Article, these implied easements will be called
2. Eg., Oliver v. Ernul, 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393 (1971); Reese v. Borghi, 216 Cal. App.
2d 324, 30 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1963); J. WEBSTER, supra note 1, § 280, at 346; 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY 1 410, at 34-35 to -75 (1979). The Reese opinion discusses, with citation to
authority, the distinction between the two types of implied easements. The types of implied ease-
ments also are contrasted in Note, ImpliedEasements afNecessiy Contrasted with Those Bared on
Quasi-Easements, 40 Ky. L.J. 324 (1952).
3. E.g., Van Sandt v. Royster, 148 Kan. 495, 83 P.2d 698 (1938); Knight v. Sheel, 313 Ky.
852, 233 S.W.2d 973 (1950); Frater Okla. Realty Corp. v. Allen Laughon Hardware Co., 206 Okla.
666, 245 P.2d 1144 (1952); 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 1411, at 34-80; 2 G. THOMPSON, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 351, at 319 (repl. ed. 1961); 3 H. TIFFANY,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 781, at 255-57 (3d ed. 1939 & Cure. Supp. 1979). See generally
Note, 25 S. CALIF. L. REv. 376 (1952); Note, supra note 2.
4. When one thus utilizes part of his land for the benefit of another part, it is frequently
said that a quasi easement exists, the part of the land which is benefited being referred to
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"easements implied from prior use," a less technical but more descrip-
tive term.
An easement by necessity can be implied on proof of two elements:
first, that the claimed dominant parcel and the claimed servient parcel
were held in a common ownership that was ended by a transfer of part
of the land; and second, that as a result of the land transfer it became
"necessary" for the claimant to have the easement.5
The easement implied from prior use is established by proof of
three elements: first, common ownership of the claimed dominant and
servient parcels and a transfer separating that ownership; second, that
before the transfer the common owner used part of the tract for the
benefit of the other part, and that this use was apparent, continuous
and permanent; and third, that the claimed easement is "necessary" to
the use of claimant's land.'
The two types of implied easements are identical in requiring
proof of the existence and separation of common ownership and ap-
pear to be identical in requiring proof that the claimed easement is
"necessary." The requirement of proof of prior use in the "quasi-ease-
ment" situation suggests, however, that the meaning of the "necessity"
requirement should differ in these two situations; otherwise, proof of
prior use would be unnecessary.
The purpose of this Article is to review and analyze opinions of
the North Carolina appellate courts that describe the "necessity" ele-
ment of proof required for establishment of these implied easements.
The burden of the argument is that the North Carolina courts have
failed to distinguish properly the "necessity" requirement as applied to
the easement by necessity from the "necessity" requirement in the case
of the easement implied from prior use.7
as the "quasi dominant tenement," and the part which is utilized for the benefit of the
other part being referred to as the "quasi servient tenement."
3 H. TiFFANY, supra note 3, § 781 at 255. Although the phrase "quasi-easement" is not unknown
in North Carolina law, see, e.g., Potter v. Potter, 251 N.C. 760, 112 S.E.2d 569 (1960), the idea
usually is expressed in a more precise manner "[Wihere one conveys a part of his estate, he
impliedly grants all those apparent or visible easements upon the part retained which were at the
time used by the grantor for the benefit of the part conveyed... :' Barwick v. Rouse, 245 N.C.
391, 393, 95 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1957).
5. E.g., 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 410, at 34-61 to -73; J. WEBSTER, supra note 1, § 281,
at 346-47.
6. E.g., 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 411, at 34-81 to -89; J. WEBSTER, supra note 1, § 282,
at 348-49. See generally Note, supra note 2; Note, supra note 3.
7. The inquiry underlying this Article is limited to the North Carolina cases dealing with
the most common forms of implied easements, usually rights of way. I have not relied on any
cases involving access to subsurface rights. The cases that form the basis for the Article are those
1980]
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Because the North Carolina courts rarely have been asked to de-
cide whether specific sets of evidence have demonstrated the "neces-
sity" required by the law, this essay is largely about dicta. Despite few
opportunities to decide whether the requirement has been satisfied, the
judges have not been reluctant to state several meanings of "necessity."
These judicial statements, rather than any actual holdings, create the
appearance that the "necessity" requirement has a substantially identi-
cal meaning in connection with the two types of implied easements.
Theoretically, if this were the law, a claimant would never be required
to prove prior use: if the uniform necessity requirement were satisfied,
an easement by necessity would be established without the need for
proof of prior use; if the necessity requirement were not satisfied,
neither type of implied easement could be established regardless of
proof of prior use.'
I doubt the courts intend this result. There is no square holding to
this effect. If not deliberate, the imprecision in the opinions probably
results from the courts' failure (or lack of opportunity) to focus on the
precise meaning of the necessity requirement in each of these two con-
texts. A major purpose of this Article, then, is to suggest that the
courts' dicta should be understood as such and should not become the
the North Carolina Supreme Court commonly refers to in its opinions and those relied on in
Professor Webster's treatise. See generally J. WEBSTER, supra note 1, §§ 281-283.
In assessing the state of the North Carolina law of "necessity" Professor Webster reached a
conclusion that differs from the argument of this Article. He said, "In other words, it would
appear that the 'necessity' requirement for establishing an implied easement through the conver-
sion of a quasi-easement into an easement is less strict than if the easement arises as an 'easement
of necessity'perse." Id. § 281, at 348 n.27 (interpreting Smith v. Moore, 254 N.C. 186, 118 S.E,2d
436 (196 1), as holding that necessity requirement for establishing implied easement via conversion
of quasi-easement less strict than that required for easement by necessity).
I believe the difference between Professor Webster's conclusion and the argument made here
can be explained on the basis that, in preparing his treatise, Professor Webster was relying on
Smith v. Moore, 254 N.C. 186, 118 S.E.2d 436 (1961), before that case was cited and, in my
opinion, misused in Oliver v. Ermul, 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393 (1971). Professor Webster did
not have an opportunity to absorb the significance of the language of Oliver, which was decided
after the publication of the treatise and is mentioned only in the pocket part supplement. Com-
pare J. WEBSTER, supra note 1, § 281 at 348 n.27 with id. (Supp. 1977).
8. The test for necessity appearing on the face of the existing North Carolina opinions is
that the claimed easement must be "necessary to the full, fair, or convenient use of the land" or
"reasonably necessary." In context, it is clear that these phrases are intended to be synonymous.
The opinions suggest that these tests apply both to the easement by necessity, Oliver v. Ernul, 277
N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393 (1971), and the easement implied from prior use, Smith v. Moore, 254
N.C. 186, 118 S.E.2d 436 (1961). See generally text accompanying notes 54-146 infra; see also
Carmon v. Dick, 170 N.C. 305, 87 S.E. 224 (1915).
Assuming that the claimant of an implied easement can show common ownership and meet
the "necessity" test as stated, why should he be asked also to show prior use? To put the question,
and thus the statement in the text, another way, if the courts mean to adopt a uniform standard for
"necessity," why not discard the entire "quasi-easement" or prior use doctrine?
19801 IMPLIED EASEMENTS
law.9
It is useful to begin with a brief, summary examination of the im-
plied easement rules as they are stated and reflected in the major secon-
dary sources of American real property law. The argument in this
impressionistic summary is that the "necessity" requirement should be
stated and understood differently in connection with each of the two
types of implied easements, regardless of the way courts choose to de-
scribe the policy basis or rationale for the implications. This summary
will provide both the background for examination of the North Caro-
lina opinions and the source of suggestions on how the North Carolina
courts might usefully restate the elements of proof for implication with-
out changing the essential meaning of the rules.
I. AN IMPRESSIONISTIC LOOK AT IMPLIED EASEMENT LAW: THE
"EXTENT OF NECESSITY" REQUIREMENT
In the seventeenth century, the English courts described the ease-
ment by necessity as an interest in land implied to serve a public policy
favoring the use of land.1" In finding an easement by necessity in 1658,
9. Judicial difficulty with the necessity requirement is not unique to North Carolina. An
appreciation of the general lack of clarity in this body of law can be developed by a mere glance at
the treatises. See, e.g., 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 3, § 786, at 269-73: "It is impossible to deduce
from the cases [on prior use theory] any general rule by which to determine the existence of this
'necessity,' so called, and such a rule is, perhaps, in the nature of things, impossible of formula-
tion." Id. at 271. The semantic difficulty is also illustrated by an excerpt from 2 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 8.43, at 263:
Where [in prior use cases] the test of necessity becomes that of reasonable necessity, it is
said that a use is reasonably necessary when it is reasonably convenient to the use of the
land benefitted. In fact, however, reasonable necessity too is a flexible test. The more
pronounced a continuous and apparent use is, the less the degree of convenience of use
necessary to the creation of an easement by implication.
In cases of easements by necessity, Powell notes: "Some courts have asserted that nothing less
than 'absolute necessity' suffices. Other courts relax this rigid rule, finding sufficient a 'high degree
of necessity' or 'reasonable necessity.' Under any one of these stated criteria, courts are bound to
differ greatly in their handling of specific fact situations." 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 410, at 34-
67 to -68. 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 3, §§ 353, 364 collects and discusses the authorities.
Some jurisdictions adhere to the rule that ways of necessity for ingress and egress across
the land of another will not be decreed unless the necessity is absolute. In other states
the rule of law is that a way of necessity must be one of strict necessity. . . . [Tihe better
rule and weight of authority seem to be that the necessity need only be a reasonable one
which renders the easement necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of
the property granted.
Id. § 364, at 440-42.
10. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 410, at 34-59; Simonton, Ways By Necessity, 25 COLUM. L.
REv. 571, 574 (1925). Simonton's article, a good short history of the easement by necessity, traces
the doctrine to the late thirteenth century when it was based on the maxim "[A]nyone who grants
a thing to someone is understood to grant that without which the thing cannot be or exist." Id. at
572. The early courts relying on this maxim were not, in any currently meaningful sense, implying
an easement on the basis of public policy. Powell describes the maxim as representing a pre-
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Chief Justice Glyn said, "[lit is not only a private inconvenience, but is
also to the prejudice of the public weal, that land should be fresh and
unoccupied.' I In 1680, Serjeant Williams prepared a note to Pomfret
v. RicroftM2 in which he described the easement by necessity as created
"by operation of law."'
13
By the nineteenth century, however, many courts described the
easement by necessity in terms of a policy to give effect to the unex-
pressed intention of the grantor and grantee rather than in terms of a
public policy favoring land use.)4 By 1815, the claimant of an ease-
ment by necessity was required to prove unity and severance of title in
addition to the necessity. 5 Faced with proofs related to land transac-
tions, judges must have been greatly tempted to think in terms of infer-
ences of actual intention. And, we are told, nineteenth century judges
were ready to yield to that temptation because of a general tendency to
draw all questions into the terminology of contract, which emphasized
individual will and intention.' 6 The judicial position that the easement
by necessity is based on inferences of intent rather than on land use
policy is exemplified by a 1915 quotation from the North Carolina
Supreme Court: "Necessity does not create the way [easement] but
merely furnishes evidence as to the real intent of the parties."' 7
public policy stage in the development of the easement by necessity. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2,
410, at 34-59. According to Simonton, "it seems clear that the judges of the 13th and 14th
centuries would not have understood this notion of public policy, for the idea of nationality had
not yet sufficiently developed." Simonton, supra, at 574.
11. Packer v. Welsted, 2 Sid. 39, 111, 82 Eng. Rep. 1244, 1284 (K.B. 1658), quoledin Simon-
ton, supra note 10, at 574 (translation and emphasis Simonton's).
12. 1 Wins. Saund. 321, 85 Eng. Rep. 454 (K.B. 1669).
13. Id. at 323 n.6, 85 Eng. Rep. at 460 n.6, quoted in Simonton, supra note 10, at 575. The
conclusion that the phrase "by operation of law" had a meaning akin to the contemporary under-
standing of a contract term imposed on the basis of overriding public policy is expressed in Note,
31 CORNELL L.Q. 516, 517 (1946):
It seems likely that Serjeant Williams considered the way by necessity to arise by a
process akin to the modem 'quasi-contract' or contract implied in law .... The indica-
tion is that [the easement . . . was thrust by law upon the parties regardless of their
intention. In fact, he does not mention as relevant the-intention of the parties.
14. Simonton, supra note 10, at 575-77.
15. Bullard v. Harrison, 4 M.&S. 387, 392, 105 Eng. Rep. 877, 879 (K.B. 1815).
16. Simonton, supra note 10, at 576.
17. Carmon v. Dick, 170 N.C. 305, 303, 87 S.E. 224, 226 (1915). The literature suggests that
by the late nineteenth century American courts recognized two distinct theories for the easement
by necessity. The public policy theory was recognized in cases such as Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass.
287 (1878): "[The rule is based on] a fiction. . . [that] there is an implied reservation or grant to
meet a special emergency, on grounds of public policy. . . in order that no land should be left
inaccessible for purposes of cultivation." Id. at 291. The inferred intent theory was recognized in
cases such as Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39, 38 Am. Dec. 61 (1842): "The law. . . will give
effect to the grant according to the presumed intent of the parties." Id. at 44, 38 Am. Dec. at 63.
Thus, although Simonton asserts that by 1925 the "notion that the easement by necessity is
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This description of the basis for the easement by necessity is nearly
identical with the courts' typical description of the policy basis for the
easement implied from prior use. 8 In the case of an easement implied
from prior use, proof of the prior use is said to support a conclusion
that the parties intended an easement, on the assumption that a grantor
and grantee would have intended to continue an important-or "neces-
sary"-use of the land known to them that was apparently continuous
and permanent in its nature.' 9 When an easement by necessity is
claimed, there is no requirement of proof of a known existing use from
which to draw the inference of intention. This leaves the proof of ne-
cessity alone to support the inference. This suggests that as courts
shifted the basis of the easement by necessity from promotion of land
use to implementation of intention, it became possible for courts and
commentators to conceptualize the two types of implied easements as
points along a continuum of inferential reasoning rather than as sepa-
rate doctrines.
That essentially is the position of the Restatement of Property.°
The Restatement describes a doctrine creating easements "by implica-
based on public policy [had] been accepted," Simonton, supra note 10 at 574, his own research
revealed a line of cases replacing the public policy basis with the presumed or inferred intent
theory, see id. at 576 nn. 24 & 25.
Most commentators recognize these two theories, although each of the treatises appears to
have a bias in favor of one or the other of the policy bases for the easement by necessity. Thomp-
son opts for public policy while recognizing that some courts derive the easement from presumed
intent. See 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 352, at 325, § 362, at 410, § 364, at 430-31, 433.
Powell seems to prefer the public policy basis for the easement by necessity; he describes the
attribution of these easements to the inferred intent of the parties as an "unadulterated fiction." 3
R. POWELL, supra note 2, 410, at 34-72.
On the other hand, .4merican Law ofProperty and the American Law Institute's Restatement
of Property (which are, on this subject, intellectual twins) share a preference for stating the basis
for all implied easements as giving effect to the inferred intent of the parties. See 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, §§ 8.33, .36, at 257-59; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 474, Com-
ment b, § 476, Comment g (1944). But at least one court that looks to the Restatement as authority
on implied easements does not accept the easement by necessity as based on a search for intent.
Schwob v. Green, 215 N.W.2d 240, 243, 244 (Iowa 1974).
As suggested by the quotation in the text, the North Carolina courts have tended to describe
the easement by necessity as based on the inferred intent of the parties. See also text accompany-
ing notes 65-68 infra.
The argument of this Article does not, however, depend on acceptance of one or the other of
these theories. See text accompanying notes 33-36 infra.
18. See 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 411, at 34-82, 92; 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 3, § 780;
Note, supra note 2, at 325.
19. E.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, §§ 8.40-.43. See also 3 R. POWELL,
supra note 2, 1 411, at 34-82 to -84. Here and at other points in the text, unless otherwise indi-
cated, the phrase "prior use" is intended to refer to a pre-existing quasi-easement that is continu-
ous, permanent and apparent.
20. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 474-476 (1944).
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tion from the circumstances under which the conveyance was made."'2t
This implication "arises as an inference of the intention of those mak-
ing a conveyance."'22 The Restatement's rule of implication operates on
the basis of eight illustrative "important circumstances"23 from which
the inference of intention may be drawn.
The "important circumstances" include the amount of considera-
tion, the extent of the prior use of the claimed easement, the degree to
which the prior use was known to the parties, whether the claimant is
the grantor or the grantee, and "the extent of necessity. '24 The circum-
stances must be understood as having variable importance in relation
to each other.2" For example, the significance of the price paid for the
land will vary in relation to the existence of other factors. A price less
than fair market value may be dispositive if the grantor is claiming the
easement. The same low price, however, will have little or no signifi-
cance if the grantee is the claimant and the "extent of necessity" is
great. The "extent of necessity" is the most significant of the circum-
stances: "In the greater number of cases [the easement's] necessity to
the use of land of the claimant is the circumstance that contributes most
to the implication of an easement. '2 6
The variable relationship among the listed circumstances and the
special significance of "necessity" are factors supporting an assertion
that the Restatement describes implied easement law as a range of in-
ferential reasoning. As the "extent of necessity" becomes greater, the
need for proof of other circumstances diminishes. Conversely, as the
"extent of necessity" diminishes, proof of one or more of the other cir-
cumstances is, correspondingly, more important. The Restatement's
comments expressly recognize that in some cases "necessity" will be the
only circumstance supporting the implication. 27 This, however, is not a
bar to implication: "If the necessity of an easement is such that without
it the land cannot be effectively used, nothing less than explicit lan-
guage in the conveyance negating the creation of the easement will pre-
vent its implication. 28
21. Id. § 474.
22. Id. § 474, Comment b.
23. Id. § 476.
24. Id.
25. See id. § 476, Comment a at 2978-79, Comment e at 2981-82, Comment g at 2983-84; 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 8.40, at 261.
26. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476, Comment g at 2983 (1944).
27. Id.
28. d. at 2984.
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Significantly, the Restatement comment explains that when neces-
sity is the only important circumstance, "the inference as to intention
which is made is influenced largely by considerations of public policy
in favor of land utilization."29 On the other hand, when the "extent of
necessity" is not so great, implication is presumably accomplished by a
more direct inference of probable actual intention. 0
Under the Restatement formulation, the "necessity" requirement
will have a different meaning and significance in a case involving proof
of prior use than it will in a case in which necessity alone supports the
implication. The "extent of necessity" rubric itself suggests a concept
with variable parameters. The Restatement's comment states that if
there is proof that the land "cannot effectively be used" without the
claimed easement, the easement will be implied unless there is explicit
language stating the parties' intention not to create the easement.3' But
if the proof shows that some use might be made of the land without the
easement, the implication is controlled by other circumstances.3 2
Eventually, without its being possible to draw any precise line, neces-
sity will not be sufficiently great to justify the implication except as it
is strengthened by reference to a prior use of the land. In the differ-
ent situations that may appear, a constantly decreasing degree of ne-
cessity will require a constantly increasing clearness of implication
from the nature of the prior use.33
A similar differentiation of the meaning and significance of the
necessity requirement would be necessary if courts did not follow the
Restatement theory but instead clearly described the easement by ne-
cessity as based on a public policy favoring land use and the easement
implied from prior use as based on inferred intention. Under this hy-
pothesis, the required showing of "necessity" in the easement by neces-
sity case would be a measure of whether, in a given case, the public
land utilization policy should be applied to impose an easement on a
party who had not expressly stated an intention to bear the burden and
who, from all else appearing at trial, had no such intention. On this
basis, judicial intervention would be inappropriate without a demon-
stration that there was no reasonable way to use claimant's land with-
out implication of the easement. 4
29. Id. at 2983.
30. See id. at 2984.
31. Id. § 476, Comment g at 2984.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Simonton took the position that the applied definition of necessity would differ depend-
ing on whether the theory for the implication was based on inferred intent or accomplishment of
1980]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, in the case of the easement implied from prior
use, proof of "necessity" would provide evidentiary support for an in-
ference that the parties probably intended to create the easement. 35 It
is quite possible, in such a case, that a reasonable use of the land could
be made without the claimed easement, as, for example, when there is
an alternative but less convenient substitute for the claimed easement.
In that case the "extent of necessity," while insufficient to invoke the
public policy supporting the easement by necessity, might be sufficient,
together with other circumstances, to suggest that the parties actually
intended to create an easement. For example, the proof might show
that although there is another reasonable way for the claimant to make
use of his land, the claimed easement is so useful that its utility, to-
gether with the extent of prior use and the parties' knowledge of that
prior use, are enough to support an inference of intent to create the
easement.
The same type of difference in the required "extent of necessity"
ought to be recognized, moreover, even if the courts describe both the
easement by necessity and the easement implied from prior use as
based on a response to the probable, actual intention of the parties
without, as in the Restatement's formulation, the influence of public
policy on the inference of intention in an easement by necessity situa-
tion.36 Under this hypothesis, in a case without proof of prior use, the
claimant is asking the court to imply an easement when proof of the
"extent of necessity" is the only basis for the inference of intention. In
that case the extent of necessity required to support the inference ought
to be greater than the extent required when other circumstances pro-
vide additional support for the inference. Conversely, when circum-
public policy. Simonton argued that if the necessity were to be considered evidence of the parties'
intent, no intent should be implied unless the extent of necessity is that there is "no other means of
access to his land." Simonton, supra note 10, at 580. Simonton contrasted this with the public
policy theory:
But as soon as it is sought to consider the matter from the social interest viewpoint,
the easement ought to be allowed whenever it is necessary to enable the owner to have
the full enjoyment of the land: it is not essential if he has an adequate though less
convenient means of access; it is essential where he has a means of access too limited to
enable him to enjoy his land fully.
Id See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476, Comment g at 2983-94 (1944). Powell, operating
on the basis that the "fictional" inferences of intention are rooted in public policy, said:
It would seem that whether easements by necessity are believed to be products of
public policy or to be the embodiments of inferences as to the intent of the parties, they
should be establishable by proof that they are necessary to the reasonable utilization of
the claiming dominant parcel.
3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 1 410, at 34-68 to -70.
35. See e.g., authorities cited note 19 su.pra.
36. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476, Comment g at 2983 (1944).
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stances such as an apparent prior use of the land support the inference
of the parties' intention, the required extent of the claimed easement's
necessity might be less than when "necessity" is the only circumstance
from which the inference of intention will be drawn.
Regardless of the expressed policy bases for the two implied ease-
ments, the required "extent of necessity" should differ in meaning and
significance depending on the existence or nonexistence of proof of
prior use. This conclusion makes it necessary to inquire whether it is
accurate or useful to say, as does the Restatement, that "no precise defi-
nition of necessity can be made."'37 A difficulty with accepting this as-
sertion is that we lawyers, like the juries before which we argue, have a
tendency to want an answer to the question "what extent of necessity is
required in this legal situation?"3 Judges customarily have answered
this question by applying an adjective such as "strict", "absolute" or
"reasonable" to the word "necessity". 39
In its relevant dictionary definition "necessary" means "that which
37. Id. at 2984. See also 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 3, § 786, at 271.
38. This question is not simply an academic exercise or a reflection of a supposed lawyer's
inclination to be concrete; the question can have real significance in a case in which the claimant
pleads and seeks to prove, alternatively, an easement by necessity and an easement implied from
prior use.
Suppose, for example, plaintiff proves his title to tract B, acquired by intestacy in 1975. His
proof also shows that tract B, together with tract A, was owned by Adams until 1910, when Adams
conveyed tract B to plaintiff's grandfather. Plaintiff also proves that there are two possible means
of access to tract B. The most direct is across a 300-foot-long drive crossing tract A. That drive
intersects a state highway. The other way, to which plaintiff concededly is entitled, goes across
neighboring land for one mile before it intersects a county road at a point four miles from the state
highway. Plaintiff then offers proof that the 300-foot drive across tract A was in use and was
apparent and continuous in 1910 when tract B was sold to his grandfather. Necessarily, however,
the witnesses offered to support this contention are elderly folks who possibly have sincere but
mistaken beliefs about the situation existing 70 years ago. Suppose, in addition to vigorously
cross-examining plaintiff's witnesses, defendant produces a credible witness, who testifies that the
use of the drive across tract A did not begin until 1918. With the case in this posture the jury
might be asked to decide whether plaintiff is entitled to an easement on either a necessity or prior
use theory.
One would suppose, on this set of facts, that a jury could find, in considering the prior use
theory, that the claimed easement is "reasonably necessary" despite the presence of another way
serving plaintiff's tract B. See note 42 infra. Suppose however, that, although the jury is per-
suaded that the claimed drive was "reasonably necessary," it fails to find that there was, before
1910, a "quasi-easement," because it is unable to reconcile the conflicting testimony. Would it be
appropriate for the jury then to turn to the easement by necessity theory and apply its earlier
finding of "reasonable necessity" to that ground for recovery?. No. The existence of another right
of way ordinarily will preclude an easement by necessity. It is necessary, therefore, to instruct the
jury that the "extent of necessity" required on the prior use theory differs from that required on
the easement by necessity theory, and to tell the jury what the different concepts of "necessity"
might mean as applied to typical fact situations.
39. See generally 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 410, at 34-67 to -69, 411, at 34-86 to -88; 3 H.
TIFFANY, supra note 3, §§ 786, 794; 3 G. THOMPSON, supra note 3, §§ 353, 364.
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cannot be done without" or "absolutely required."4 "Essential" and
"indispensable" are useful synonyms.4 1 The words "essential" and "in-
dispensable" ordinarily are not susceptible to modification in terms of
degree. Something is "essential" or it is not. We tend, however, to
modify the word "necessary" because we often do not use it as a syno-
nym for "essential" and because we always are faced with the question:
"Necessary for (or to) what?" If we define the objective, we refine our
understanding of the actual, contextual meaning of the word "neces-
sary." Thus, if I say, "It is necessary for me to have a vacation," most
people will hear "necessary" as synonymous with "important" or "de-
sirable." If I say, however, "It is necessary for me to breathe," the ap-
propriate synonym is "essential. '42
Judges have modified "necessary" with the adjectives "strict" or
"absolute" and "reasonable." 43 Recognizing that in an easement by
necessity case the extent or degree of "necessity" must be greater than
in cases in which there is proof of prior use, courts often have used
"strict" or "absolute" to modify the "necessity" required for the ease-
ment by necessity.44 We even find cases speaking of "indispensable
necessity. ' 45  These formulations, apparently meaning "essential,"
prove to be unsatisfactory because, when presented with the hard cases,
neither the courts nor the Restatement intend to define "necessary" as
"essential"-even in the absence of proof of prior use. For example,
the Restatement comment tells us: "If land can be used without an
easement, but cannot be used without disproportionate effort and ex-
pense, an easement may still be implied. . . on the basis of necessity
alone, without reference to prior use."'46 This is not, strictly speaking, a
description of something that is "essential." Instead, the Restatement
40. 2 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1511 (1971).
41. Id. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 877 (1969)
(words "essential" and "indispensable" are synonyms but "stronger" than word "necessary").
42. "[The] force and meaning [of 'necessary'] must be determined with relation to the partic-
ular object sought." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 928 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Kay County Excise
Board v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 185 Okla. 327, 91 P.2d 1087, 1088 (1939)).
43. Eg., Kirkland v. Kirkland, 281 Ala. 42,47, 198 So. 2d 771, 775 (1967) ("indispensable");
Zunino v. Gabriel, 182 Cal. App. 2d 613, 616, 6 Cal. Rptr. 514, 517 (1960) ("absolute"); Marrs v.
Ratliff, 278 Ky. 164, 174, 128 S.W.2d 604, 609 (1939) ("strict"); Tschaggeny v. Union Pac. Land
Resources Corp., 555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976) ("reasonably necessary"). See generally authori-
ties cited note 39 supra.
44. E.g., Zunino v. Gabriel, 182 Cal. App. 2d 613, 616, 6 Cal. Rptr. 514, 517 (1960); Marrs. v.
Ratliff, 278 Ky. 164, 174, 128 S.W.2d 604, 609 (1939); Hansel v. Collins, 180 Md. 209, 216, 23 A.2d
686, 690 (1942); Bowles v. Chapman, 180 Tenn. 321, 324, 175 S.W.2d 313, 314 (1943).
45. E.g., Kirkland v. Kirkland, 281 Ala. 42,47, 198 So. 2d 771, 775 (1967); Hall v. MeLoed,
59 Ky. (2 Met.) 98 (1859); Rogers v. Cation, 9 Wash. 2d. 369, 378, 115 P.2d 702, 707 (1941).
46. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476, Comment g at 2983 (1944).
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and the courts seem to define a "necessary" easement as one required
to provide the landowner with a reasonably effective right to use his
land. Thus, in a case in which there is access to the landlocked parcel
by means of a permissive way (a license), an easement of access is not
"essential" but it is "necessary" within the meaning of the rule.47 Like-
wise, when access can be had only by water48 or by making very expen-
sive improvements, a right of way is not essential but it is
"necessary. '49
Understanding that the requirement in an easement by necessity
case is not that the easement be "essential," some courts have aban-
doned the adjectives "strict" and "absolute" in describing the require-
ment. Instead these courts use the phrase "reasonable necessity."5
But, not surprisingly, this is the same phrase courts use to describe the
required "extent of necessity" in the cases in which there is proof of
prior use.5' Thus, the use of adjectives to describe the range of mean-
ing of "necessity" fails because of the improper premise that the
phrases "absolute necessity" or "strict necessity" accurately describe
the requirement when there is no proof of prior use. Forced to discard
"strict," "absolute" and "indispensable," the courts have turned to the
law's most popular adjective, "reasonable," only to find that this word
is already engaged-in the prior use theory cases. Modification by ad-
jective, then, is not an effective technique for distinguishing between
the "extent of necessity" required in a case with proof of prior use and
that required in a case without such proof.
Professor Powell suggests an attractive solution to the problem of
stating the "extent of necessity" concept for the prior use situation that
47. E.g., Wilson v. Smith, 18 N.C. App. 414, 197 S.E.2d 579, cert. denied, 284 N.C. 125, 199
S.E.2d 664 (1973); Parker v. Bains, 194 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
48. E.g., Redman v. Kidwell, 180 So.2d 682 (Fla. Civ. App. 1965); Hancock v. Henderson,
236 Md. 98, 103, 202 A.2d 599, 602 (1964); State v. Deal, 191 Ore. 661, 680, 233 P.2d 242, 250
(1951). But see, e.g., Woelfel v. Tyng, 221 Md. 539, 544, 158 A.2d 311, 313 (1960); Bauman v.
Wagner, 146 App. Div. 191, 195, 130 N.Y.S. 1016, 1020 (1911). See generally 3 R. POWELL, supra
note 2, 410, at 34-68 to -69 nn.34 & 35; 3 G. THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 364, at 436. There
appears to be a division of authority with respect to this question.
49. The Restatement would permit a finding of "necessity" if the alternative to the claimed
easement would require "disproportionate effort and expense." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 476, Comment g at 2983 (1944). This position is adopted in a number of the cases. E.g., Condry
v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 41 A.2d 66 (1945); Crotty v. Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S.E. 233 (1913).
50. E.g., Walkup v. Becker, 161 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla. 1964); Cummings v. Franco, 335 Mass.
639, 643, 141 N.E.2d 514, 516 (1957); Hurley v. Guzzi, 328 Mass. 293, 296, 103 N.E.2d 321, 323
(1952); Tschaggeny v. Union Pac. Land Resources Corp., 555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976). See
generally 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 410; 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 3, § 794.
51. E.g., Jack v. Hunt, 200 Or. 263, 268-69, 264 P.2d 461, 463-64 (1953); Silver v. Strohm, 39
Wash. 2d 1, 5, 234 P.2d 481, 483 (1951). See generally 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 411, at 34-87
to -89.
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distinguishes it from the similar concept in the easement by necessity
rule. Powell suggests that in a case with proof of prior use, the word
"necessity" should be replaced by the phrase "important to the enjoy-
ment of the conveyed quasi-dominant parcel. '5 2 If, as seems clear, the
purpose of the requirement in this context is to support the inference of
actual intention, surely the word "important" suffices as well as "neces-
sary." In their ordinary meanings, moreover, the words "necessary"
and "important" suggest the range of degree of utility connoted by the
phrases "strict necessity" and "reasonable necessity." The British
courts have actually gone beyond this and abandoned the "necessity"
element altogether in the prior use cases; easements there are implied
merely from proof of an "apparent" and "continuous" quasi-ease-
ment.5
3
II. THE NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
The easement by necessity has long been recognized in North Car-
olina law but has had a rather peculiar history. It first appeared-in an
unusual form-in the 1852 North Carolina Supreme Court case,
Heofeld v. Baum.54 Hefeld involved a statute designed to cope with
the problem of wrecked ships along the state's treacherous Atlantic
coastline. Basically, the statute established a procedure whereby state
officials would salvage the cargo of the wrecked vessel, auction the
goods at public sale, and turn the proceeds over to the shipowner. In
Heofeld, the court declared an easement "by necessary implication"
from the statute to ensure that authorized persons could travel over
privately held land on which the ships were stranded or wrecked to
carry out the statutory functions."
More than fifty years later, in 1904, the supreme court recognized,
in Milliken v. Denny,56 the more traditional easement by necessity.
52. 3 R. POWELL supra note 2, 411, at 34-82, 34-87 to -89. One American court appears to
have accepted Professor Powell's suggestion. See Dressier v. Isaacs, 217 Or. 586, 597-98, 343 P.2d
714, 720 (1959); accord, Winter v. Satchell, 261 Or. 517, 495 P.2d 738 (1972); Silvernale v. Logan,
252 Or. 200, 208, 448 P.2d 530, 533-34 (1968).
53. See 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 411, at 34-89.
54. 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 269 (1852).
55. Id. at 271.
56. 135 N.C. 19, 47 S.E. 132 (1904). The court ruled that the trial judge erred in refusing to
sustain a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint asserting an easement to serve a lot that fronted on two
streets. The court held that on the facts of the pleadings "no easement... would arise .. , by
...necessity." Id. at 24, 47 S.E. at 133.
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From Miliken until Oliver v. Ernul57 in 1971, virtually everything the
North Carolina Supreme Court said about the easement by necessity,
was dicta. In only one case did the supreme court reverse a trial court
decision that might have been construed to declare an easement by ne-
cessity." In no case did the court affirm a trial court decision declaring
an easement by necessity or remand a case for entry of judgment de-
claring such an easement.5 9 In all but one60 of the other pre-1971 cases,
the court's statements about the doctrine are either completely gratui-
tous or made in the context of an opinion in which the issue is the
sufficiency of the pleadings rather than the sufficiency of proof.6'
The absence of a decision based on an easement by necessity
theory before 1971 might be explained by the uncertainty created by
White v. Coghill,62 which intimated that the common law doctrine of
easement by necessity had been superseded by the state's statutory
cartway procedure. After this doubt was explicitly removed by Pritch-
ard v. Scott63 in 1961, the next implied easement case to reach the
Supreme Court, Oliver v. Ernul64 in 1971, resulted in a decision
squarely recognizing the creation of an easement by necessity.
With the exception of He'feld v. Baum, a somewhat exceptional
case, and a few stray statements in other opinions, the North Carolina
Supreme Court consistently has stated that both the easement by neces-
sity and the easement implied from prior use are based on the policy of
carrying out the inferred intention of the parties. For example, in 1915,
57. 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393 (1971). The court reversed a judgment of nonsuit and held
that plaintiffs had a way of necessity "by operation of law" to secure access to landlocked parcels.
58. Roper Lumber Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 158 N.C. 162, 73 S.E. 902 (1912). The
court reversed a decision dissolving an injunction against defendant. The defendant was not enti-
tled to an easement by necessity because, inter alia, there was no proof that defendant had "no
other possible way to remove the timber." Id. at 141, 73 S.E. at 905.
59. But see Caron v. Dick, 170 N.C. 305, 87 S.E. 224 (1915) (new trial ordered; judgment of
nonsuit set aside; "some evidence" upon which plaintiff entitled to recover on theory of easement
by necessity).
60. White v. Coghill, 201 N.C. 421, 160 S.E. 472 (1931). This case arguably held that the
easement by necessity doctrine was superseded by the state's statutory cartway procedure. See
text accompanying notes 81-89 infra.
61. "[W]e have found no decision where a plaintiff, by action in the superior court, has estab-
lished his right to and the location of a way of necessity." Pritchard v. Scott, 254 N.C. 277, 283,
118 S.E.2d 890, 895 (1961); see Carver v. Leatherwood, 230 N.C. 96, 52 S.E.2d 1 (1949) (complaint
alleging separation of title, open and visible condition of prior use and no alternative way of
access sufficient to withstand demurrer on either prior use or necessity theory); Bradley v. Bradley,
245 N.C. 483, 961S.E.2d 417 (1957) (jury verdict establishing easement for plaintiff reversed; plain-
tiff conceded nonentitlement to easement by necessity); Potter v. Potter, 251 N.C. 760, 112 S.E.2d
569 (1960) (dictum); Smith v. Moore, 254 N.C. 186, 118 S.E.2d 436 (1961) (dictum).
62. 201 N.C. 421, 160 S.E. 472 (1931); see text accompanying notes 81-89 infra.
63. 254 N.C. 277, 284-85, 118 S.E.2d 890, 895-96 (1961).
64. 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393 (1971).
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in Carmon v. Dick,65 the court described the easement by necessity:
"[The] necessity of itself not creating the right; but being only a cir-
cumstance resorted to for the purpose of showing the intention of the
parties, ... 66
And in 1961, in Smith v. Moore,67 the court described the ease-
ment implied from prior use:
It is sufficient to show such physical conditions and such use as
would reasonably lead one to believe that grantor intended grantee
should have the right to continue to use the road in the same manner
and to the same extent which his grantor had used it, because such
use was reasonably necessary to the 'fair'... 'full'... 'convenient
and comfortable'.., enjoyment of his property.68
Carmon v. Dick6 9 is the earliest North Carolina implied easement
opinion with any significant doctrinal discussion. In that case, plaintiff
based his claim to use of a private road on a claim of prescription as
well as claims of easement by necessity and easement implied from
prior use.70 Plaintiffs evidence was that while his and the defendant's
land were in common ownership, the owner opened a road across the
lands to a public road. Plaintiff alleged that the road opened by the
common owner was the only way out to the public road.7 The trial
judge granted defendant's motion for nonsuit at the close of plaintiffs
evidence. The supreme court reversed, holding that there was some
evidence upon which plaintiff might have recovered on a theory of
easement by necessity.72
The court began its opinion with a statement of the elements of
proof for easements implied from prior use: (i) separation of title; (ii)
prior use "so long continued and so obvious or manifest as to show that
it was meant to be permanent"; and (iii) that the claimed easement was
"necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land. '73 The court de-
clined, however, to decide the case on the prior use theory because it
65. 170 N.C. 305, 87 S.E. 224 (1915).
66. Id. at 308, 87 S.E. at 226 (citations omitted).
67. 254 N.C. 186, 118 S.E.2d 436 (1961).
68. Id. at 190, 118 S.E.2d at 438-39 (citations omitted).
69. 170 N.C. 305, 87 S.E. 224 (1915).
70. Id. at 309, 87 S.E. at 226.
71. Plaintiff "alleged. . . [his land was]. . . so surrounded by the lands of his grantors and
others that he had no way out to any public road." Id. at 306, 87 S.E. at 225. "We do not hold
that plaintiff is entitled to the right of way, as matter [sic] of law, but simply that there was some
evidence on which he was entitled to recover." Id. at 309-10, 87 S.E. at 226.
72. Id. at 309-10, 87 S.E. at 225-26.
73. Id. at 308, 87 S.E. at 226. The opinion quotes language from Irvine v. McCreary, 108 Ky.
495, 56 S.W. 966 (1900), describing the easement from prior use. The quotation uses the phrase
"reasonably necessary" to describe the required standard of "necessity."
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chose not to decide the then unresolved question whether any right of
way was sufficiently "continuous" to support the inference of inten-
tion.74
The court then turned to the easement by necessity theory. The
court clearly stated its view that the theory was based on the policy of
fulfilling the intention of the parties.75 Unfortunately, the court was
not so clear in its description of the necessity requirement under this
theory. In one portion of the opinion, following a quotation about
ways of necessity, the court states that the "degree of necessity" for
"this right by implication based upon the presumed intention of the
parties" is that the claimed easement is "necessary to the beneficial use
of the land granted or retained" 76 and to its convenient and comforta-
ble enjoyment. This language is substantially identical with the court's
description of the necessity requirement in the case of an easement im-
plied from prior use.77
This similarity of language is not surprising because in discussing
both types of implied easements the court cites Kely v. Dunning,78 a
New Jersey case involving only the prior use theory. The citation to
Kelly in the paragraph apparently dealing with easements by necessity
is, of course, curious. It may indicate that the court was returning to its
discussion of the prior use theory, or that the court was simply confused
about or overlooked the distinction between the two theories of impli-
cation. In any event, Carmon offers no clear indication of the court's
view of the necessity requirement under the easement by necessity the-
ory; the opinion's lack of clarity suggests, but does not require, a con-
clusion that the court adopted a uniform "necessity" requirement for
both implied easements.79
74. "[An] easement which is not apparent and noncontinuous, such as a right of way, which
is enjoyed at intervals, leaving no visible sign, in the interim of its existence, will not pass unless
the grantor uses language sufficient to create the easement de novo." 170 N.C. at 308, 87 S.E. at
226. The court recognized later in its opinion that the continuity requirement was not universally
applied in that way and that there was a tendency to accept a roadway as sufficiently "continuous"
for purposes of the doctrine. For a description and critiqug of the position actually taken by the
court, see 3 R POWELL, supra note 2, 411, at 34-85 to -86 (1979). Later North Carolina opinions
have not found this problem troublesome. See, e.g., Spruill v. Nixon, 238 N.C. 523, 78 S.E.2d 323
(1953); Dorman v. Wayah Valley Ranch, Inc., 6 N.C. App. 497, 170 S.E.2d 509 (1969).
75. 170 N.C. 305, 308-09, 87 S.E. 224, 226 (1915).
76. Id. at 309, 87 S.E. at 226.
77. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
78. 43 N.J. Eq. 62, 10 A. 276 (1887).
79. Even if Cannon did intend to state an identical requirement of necessity for each type of
implied easement, the opinion may not be responsible for the confusion that crept into North
Carolina law in Oliver v. Ernul, 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393 (1971). See text accompanying
notes 117-34 infra. In general Carmon has not been cited for the proposition that the necessity test
1980)
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Any uncertainty created by Carmon might have been cured
through the usual process of case-by-case adjudication, had the court's
next implied easement case not been White Y. Coghill,10 which possibly
had the effect of discouraging North Carolina attorneys from litigating
cases on the basis of an easement by necessity theory.8'
While v. Coghill is clearly the worst North Carolina implied ease-
ment opinion. Plaintiff appealed from a nonsuit entered on the ground
that plaintiff's proper remedy was to seek a statutory cartway 82 rather
than a judicial declaration of an easement by necessity. Plaintiff, a dev-
isee of a fifty acre tract of land, alleged that the land devised was with-
out any access to a public road except across the lands of other devisees
of the testator.8
3
is identical in each context, despite the language in the opinion that can be read as stating that
proposition, and Oliver does not cite Cannon in its discussion of the necessity requirement.
80. 201 N.C. 421, 160 S.E. 472 (1931).
81. Of the cases decided between 1931, the date of the White opinion, and 1961, when Mlte
was overruled in Pritchard v. Scott, 254 N.C. 277, 118 S.E.2d 696 (1961), only Carver v. Leather-
wood, 230 N.C. 96, 52 S.E.2d 1 (1949), involved a claim based on easement by necessity theory. In
that case claimant asserted his right to an easement on the two theories alternatively. The scarcity
of easement by necessity claims is, of course, explicable on hypotheses other than the impact of
White v. Coghill.
82. The modem cartway statute is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-69 (1974). The statutory cartway is
a very limited form of authorized private eminent domain. The statute gives the owners of land to
which there is no public road or other adequate means of transportation the right to have a
cartway laid across neighboring land if the petitioner is engaged in one or more specific activities
on the land (not including mere residential use) and upon petitioner's payment of damages. See
generally Taylor v. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 262 N.C. 452, 137 S.E.2d 833 (1964); Candler v.
Sluder, 259 N.C. 62, 130 S.E.2d 1 (1963); Pritchard v. Scott, 254 N.C. 277, 118 S.E.2d 890 (1961).
The Pritchard court held that the statutory requirement of no "adequate means of transporta-
tion" would not be met if the petitioner were entitled to an easement by necessity across the lands
of one of his neighbors. The court then held that White . Coghill was wrong in intimating that
the statutory cartway supersedes the common law easement by necessity. Actually, the two rights
are complementary.
83. 201 N.C. at 422, 160 S.E. at 472 (1931). These facts may raise an issue not treated in the
White opinion: Is a devise the type of "grant" that forms the basis for the easement by necessity
theory? Professor Webster cites White for the proposition that "a devisee of land cannot establish
a way of necessity over the lands of other devisees even though the land devised to him has no
access to a public road." J. WEBSTER, supra note 1, § 281, at 347. This proposition does fit the
facts of White but does not reflect the opinion by Justice Brogden. It seems more likely that this
issue was avoided by the court because the judges preferred to reach the same result by a different
argument.
The notion that a devise cannot form the basis for an easement by necessity is not accepted by
the major text writers. See, e.g., 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, g 410, at 34-63 (1979); 2 G. THOMP-
SON, supra note 3, § 362, at 412. Moreover, Pritchard . Scott, the case that rejects the exclusive
remedy theory of White, involves similar facts. There the question was whether a devisee's possi-
ble easement by necessity across the lands of another devisee from the same will would constitute
an "adequate means" of access so as to disable the devisee from claiming a cartway across the
lands of strangers. The court held that no cartway was available across the lands of strangers.
This conclusion was based on reasoning that required an implicit acceptance of the possibility that
a devisee can acquire an easement by necessity across the lands of another devisee. For these
reasons it seems unlikely that White can be fairly read as establishing the proposition that a devise
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Justice Brogden began his short affirmance by stating plaintiff's
contention of entitlement to a way of necessity. He then cited six North
Carolina cases that he described as discussing the "way of necessity." 4
Two of the cited cases do not deal with ways of necessity at all; one
involves the law of easement by prescription, 5 and the other is an ac-
tion for damages in tort for loss of the right of access to timber land. 6
Justice Brogden then quoted statements from Mordecai's Law Lectures
describing easements by necessity and stating that in North Carolina
there is a "peculiar way of necessity"-the statutory cartway8 7 Then,
without any analysis or citation of authority, Justice Brogden con-
cluded that the statutory cartway was "the exclusive remedy" to which
the plaintiff was entitled. 8
The White opinion possibly had a "chilling effect" on litigants' de-
cisions to claim the common law easement by necessity. All but one of
the appellate cases from 1931 to 1961 involving implied easements
presented claims expressly based only on a prior use theory.89
The court's treatment of these prior use theory claims was, for the
most part, consistent and sensible. As stated in Ferrell v. Durham Bank
& Trust Co. ,90 and quoted in many of the cases of this period, the prior
use theory provides for the declaration of an easement when a grantor
"impliedly grants all those apparent or visible easements upon the part
retained which were at the time used by the grantor for the benefit of
the part conveyed, and which are reasonably necessary for the use of
will not establish the basis for an easement by necessity. Cf. Potter v. Potter, 251 N.C. 760, 112
S.E.2d 569 (1960) ( White v. Coghill not inconsistent with proposition that division of concurrent
ownership can form the basis for the implication of an easement from prior use).
84. 201 N.C. at 423, 160 S.E. at 473.
85. Weaver v. Pitts, 191 N.C. 747, 133 S.E. 2 (1926).
86. Grant v. Tallassee Power Co., 196 N.C. 617, 146 S.E. 531 (1929).
87. 201 N.C. at 423, 160 S.E. 472, 473 (citing 1 S. MORDECAI, LAW LECTURES 466 (2d ed.
1916)).
88. Id.
89. Smith v. Moore, 254 N.C. 186, 118 S.E.2d 436 (1961) (prior use theory); Potter v. Potter,
251 N.C. 760, 112 S.E.2d 569 (1960) (prior use theory); Bradley v. Bradley, 245 N.C. 483, 96
S.E.2d 417 (1957) (prior use theory; claimant conceded there was no basis for easement by neces-
sity); Barwick v. Rouse, 245 N.C. 391, 95 S.E.2d 869 (1957) (prior use theory); Spruill v. Nixon,
238 N.C. 523, 78 S.E.2d 323 (1953) (prior use theory); Packard v. Smart, 224 N.C. 480, 31 S.E.2d
517 (1944) (prior use theory or estoppel); Ferrell v. Durham Bank & Trust Co., 221 N.C. 432, 20
S.E.2d 329 (1942) (prior use theory).
Only in Carver v. Leatherwood, 230 N.C. 96, 52 S.E.2d 1 (1949), were both the easement by
necessity and prior use theories raised. Dictum in the opinion implicitly recognizes the easement
by necessity doctrine; the court suggested that on remand plaintiff should select one or the other of
those theories. The way of necessity doctrine is alluded to in dicta in Green v. Barbee, 238 N.C.
77, 76 S.E.2d 307 (1953).
90. 221 N.C. 432, 20 S.E.2d 329 (1942).
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that part."'" An alternative statement of the necessity requirement
found in many of these cases is derived from Carmon v. Dick:92 the
claimed easement must be "necessary to the beneficial use of the land
granted or retained. '93
Barwick v. Rouse94 is the most significant of these prior use cases.
There the court held that the prior use theory had been fairly presented
to the jury with an adequate instruction.95 Chief Justice Winborne col-
lected the court's various statements of prior use theory law and de-
scribed the necessity requirement variously as proof that the easement
was "reasonably necessary for the use of the land," "reasonably neces-
sary to the fair enjoyment" of the land, and "necessary to the beneficial
enjoyment of the land."96
These statements of the necessity requirement for an easement im-
plied from a quasi-easement were again approved in 1961 in Smith v.
Moore.97 In Smith, the plaintiff brought an action to enjoin defend-
ants' alleged continuing trespass on a road across plaintiff's land. Orig-
inally, plaintiffs and defendants' land had been held in common
ownership. In 1951, the owner conveyed the southern portion of his
tract to plaintiff and the northern portion to intermediate grantees from
whom defendants subsequently acquired title. Plaintiffs tract was
bounded by a public road. Defendants' tract, bounded on the north by
the Neuse River, had no direct access to a public road.98
Defendants alleged that in 1951, when the title was separated,
there was a road crossing the southern portion of the land, which pro-
vided access to the northern portion now owned by defendants. De-
fendants claimed a right to use this way on grounds that the private
91. Id. at 435, 20 S.E.2d at 331, quotedin, e.g., Barwick v. Rouse, 245 N.C. 391, 393, 95
S.E.2d 869, 871 (1957); Packard v. Smart, 224 N.C. 480, 484, 31 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1944). The same
statement appeared in Carmon v. Dick, 170 N.C. 305, 306-07, 87 S.E.2d 224, 225 (1915).
92. 170 N.C. 305, 87 S.E. 224 (1915).
93. Id. at 309, 87 S.E. at 226, quotedin, e.g., Bradley v. Bradley, 245 N.C. 483, 486, 96 S.E.2d
417, 420 (1957); Spruill v. Nixon, 238 N.C. 523, 526, 78 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1953) (without attribution
to Carmon or Ferrell but instead, accurately, to 17 AM. JUR. Easements § 34 (1938)).
94. 245 N.C. 391, 95 S.E.2d 869 (1957).
95. Id. at 394, 95 S.E.2d at 872; see Smith v. Moore, 254 N.C. 186, 191, 118 S.E.2d 436, 439
(1961) (error in part of jury instruction not cured by later instructions "quoted from Barwick"
giving "the correct rule").
96. 245 N.C. 391, 393-94, 95 S.E.2d 869, 871.
97. 254 N.C. 186, 118 S.E.2d 436 (1961). In the period between Barwick and Smih the court
explicitly relied on the Barwick formulations in Bradley v. Bradley, 245 N.C. 483, 96 S.E.2d 417
(1957), and Potter v. Potter, 251 N.C. 760, 112 S.E.2d 569 (1960).
98. 254 N.C. at 187, 118 S.E.2d at 436.
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way had become a public road,99 and that they had acquired rights by
prescription. "0
The jury decided in favor of defendants. The trial judge then or-
dered the defendants' pleadings amended to conform to the evidence, it
appearing that the verdict was, in effect, based on the finding of an
easement by implication from prior use.' Plaintiff appealed and se-
cured from the supreme court the order of a new trial because the jury
instructions on the prior use theory had been confusing.10 2
At the beginning of its opinion the court described the nature of
easements by implication from a prior use:
The right to use a road or other easement may arise from the use of
the word "appurtenant" or "appurtenance" because of conditions ex-
isting at the time of the grant so apparent and beneficial to the thing
granted as to lead to the conclusion that the parties contemplated
these physical conditions would continue as reasonably necessary to
the enjoyment of the property conveyed.' 0 3
The court then digressed to describe-perhaps for purposes of
contrast-the easement by necessity:
If one conveys a part of his property entirely surrounded by other
lands of the grantor and without any way to the property conveyed,
the law, acting upon the assumption that grantor intended for his
grantee to enjoy the thinfranted, will imply an easement to provide
access for a public way.wlm
The court noted, however, that the easement by necessity was not
the theory relied on by defendants to establish their right to cross plain-
tiffs land. Defendants' theory was, instead, an easement derived from
prior use.'05 In describing the prior use theory-the only theory truly
99. The court concluded that the evidence would support, but not compel, a finding that the
road "served a public purpose" and was a "neighborhood road." Id. at 189, 118 S.E.2d at 438.
100. Id. at 188, 118 S.E.2d at 437 (citations omitted). Apparently the pleadings in the case
were confusing and the trial court ordered that the defendants' pleadings be amended to conform
to the proof. Id. The opinion of the supreme court does not deal with prescription; the trial court
apparently treated the case as involving an easement claimed on a prior use theory. Id. at 190, 118
S.E.2d at 439.
101. Id. at 186, 188, 191, 118 S.E.2d at 437, 439.
102. Id. at 191, 118 S.E.2d at 439.
103. Id. at 190, 118 S.E.2d at 438 (citing Barwick v. Rouse, 245 N.C. 391, 95 S.E.2d 869
(1957)) (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 190, 118 S.E.2d at 438. There is ample internal evidence that the court intended the
paragraph from which this quotation is taken to be a digression from the rationale of the case.
The last sentence of the paragraph states that the "[diefendants do not claim an easement by
necessity." Id. The citations in this paragraph to He#/eld v. Baum, Cannon v. Dick and Roper
Lumber Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works indicate that the court was quite conscious that it was here
describing a theory distinct from the prior use theory described in its immediately preceding para-
graph that formed the only basis for its resolution of the case.
105. See note 104 supra.
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at issue in the case-the court said:
To establish the right to use a road as appurtenant to the property
granted, it is not necessary to show absolute necessiy. It is sufficient to
show such physical conditions and such use as would reasonably lead
one to believe that grantor intended grantee should have the right to
continue to use the road in the same manner and to the same extent
which his grantor had used it, because such use was reasonably neces-
sary to the "fair". . . "full". . "convenient and comfortable".
enjoyment of his property. 10 6
With respect to the creation of an easement based on prior use,
Smith v. Moore teaches that the test for necessity is not the test of "ab-
solute necessity" but is instead whether the easement is "reasonably
necessary" to the fair, full, convenient and comfortable enjoyment of
the property.
The definition of necessity was important in Smith. This is one of
the few North Carolina cases in which there was some question
whether the claimed easement actually was necessary. The plaintiff,
denying the easement, introduced evidence of another road providing
access for the defendants. 0 7 The trial judge instructed the jury "that
whether there was another road or whether there was not is not an issue
for you to pass upon here."'' 10 This instruction was erroneous because
under the "reasonable necessity" test, the jury should have been per-
mitted to consider whether the existence of the other road, perhaps an
equally convenient means of access for the defendant, would tend to
negate the inference of the grantor's intention to provide his grantee
with the right to continue to use the quasi-easement. 0 9 This error was
not cured by the trial court's subsequent quotations from Barwick v.
Rouse that gave the jury a correct statement of the law. 10
Smith's significance as precedent is limited to its statements about
the issue before it-the prior use theory. In connection with that the-
ory, the court concluded that the appropriate test for necessity is
whether the claimed use is "reasonably necessary to the fair, full, con-
venient and comfortable enjoyment of the property.""' There is no
indication in the opinion itself that this test was intended to be used in
106. 254 N.C. at 190, 118 S.E.2d at 438-39 (emphasis added).
107. 254 N.C. at 191, 118 S.E.2d at 439.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 190, 118 S.E.2d at 438-39.
110. Id. at 191, 118 S.E.2d at 439.
I1l. Id. at 190, 118 S.E.2d at 439.
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determining the existence of an easement by necessity. 1 2
In the same year, the court decided Pritchard v. Scott,"3 a cartway
proceeding. To determine whether petitioner was entitled to a cartway,
the court was forced to consider whether petitioner might have ac-
quired an easement by necessity against a contemporaneous devisee.' 4
This required the court to decide directly whether White v. Coghill had
properly held that the statutory cartway procedure superseded the com-
mon law doctrine of easement by necessity. 5 An analysis of the White
opinion, its citations and its misplaced reliance on one phrase from
Mordecai persuaded the court that White's "exclusive remedy" theory
enjoyed no support in North Carolina law. In Pritchard, the court once
again expressly declared the easement by necessity doctrine to be rec-
ognized in North Carolina.' 6
Ten years later the court decided Oliver v. Ernul.117 This was an
action to restrain the defendant from obstructing a claimed right of way
over the defendant's land to a public road. Plaintiffs' evidence was that
defendant Ernul owned, and then divided, a rectangular shaped tract of
land near Morehead City that fronted on Route 70 to the south. In
1954, Ernul conveyed the northern portion of his land to Mansfield and
the center portion of the land to Oliver. Ernul retained ownership of
the southern portion of the land abutting on Route 70. At the time of
112. The Smith opinion does not advert to the language of Carmon v. Dick that arguably
states the "reasonable necessity" test in connection with the easement by necessity.
113. 254 N.C. 277, 118 S.E.2d 890 (1961).
114. Petitioner was the widow of Pritchard Sr., who had devised the northern portion of his
farm to his wife and the southern portion to his son by a former marriage, Pritchard Jr. Peti-
tioner's land did not abut on a public road; Pritchard Jr.'s land abutted a road. Petitioner brought
a cartway proceeding against Pritchard Jr. and several other nearby landowners. Defendants
Scott, owners of the land across which a cartway most probably would be laid, answered and
alleged that petitioner had an easement, by necessity or on a prior use theory, across the lands of
Pritchard Jr. This, asserted the Scotts, constituted an adequate means of access and thus disabled
petitioner from claiming a cartway. Id. at 278-79, 118 S.E.2d at 891-92.
The trial court found that petitioner had not acquired an easement across the lands of Pritch-
ard Jr. The Scotts appealed. Justice Bobbitt, writing for a unanimous court, concluded that if
petitioner was entitled to a way of necessity over the land of Pritchard Jr., she would not be
entitled to a cartway. But the justice added that the court had found no decision in its reported
cases in which a claimant had established an easement by necessity. Id. at 283, 118 S.E.2d at 815.
115. Justice Bobbit also conceded that there was some support in White v. Coghill for the
assertion that the common law way of necessity had been superseded by the cartway procedure.
The court concluded, however, that White was wrong: the statement by Mordecai about the
cartway, a "peculiar way of necessity," was in a separate paragraph, following Mordecai's discus-
sion of the common law easement by necessity, and did not support the holding of the case. Id. at
284-85, 118 S.E.2d at 896.
116. Justice Bobbitt pointed out that in a number of cases after White the court had "stated
and recognized" the common law of easement by necessity. Id.
117. 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393 (1971).
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Ernul's division of his tract, a narrow dirt road running along the east-
ern edge of the land provided access to Route 70. After the land was
divided, the only other way out from the northern or center portions of
the land was across railroad tracks to the north.118
Ten years after the land was divided, the owners of the lots drafted
a legal instrument they called a "Rightaway Deed.""' 9  The
"Rightaway Deed" purported to create rights in all the parties to use
the dirt road. The instrument described the easement in language ap-
proximating legal jargon and left some uncertainty as to its exact loca-
tion. Ernul denied that he executed the instrument. 120
Five years after execution of the "Rightaway Deed," the land-
owner adjoining the lands to the east erected a fence along the bound-
ary. This fence narrowed the dirt access road. Shortly thereafter,
Ernul, or his tenant, Stamps, blocked the dirt road by placing a post in
its center at the point where the road passed the dwelling house owned
by Ernul and occupied by Stamps. This forced the plaintiffs to exit
from their property across the railroad tracks to the north, resulting in
damage to their cars. 12 1
After plaintiffs' presentation of evidence at trial, defendant suc-
cessfully moved for nonsuit. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that although the "Rightaway Deed" was poorly drafted, it was legally
sufficient to create an express twenty-foot easement extending from
Highway 70 along the eastern line of the land originally owned by
Ernul and serving each of the three tracts.' 22 The supreme court al-
lowed certiorari. 123
Justice Huskins' stated that the "Rightaway Deed" was legally in-
sufficient to grant an easement because it failed to identify with reason-
able certainty the location of the easement and the dominant and
servient tenements.124 The court, however, affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals on a theory of "way of necessity by operation of
law." 125
Had the evidence been properly developed, plaintiffs in Oliver v.
Ernul might have established that when Ernul separated his tract into
118. Id. at 594-96, 178 S.E.2d at 394-95.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 596, 178 S.E.2d at 395.
122. 9 N.C. App. 221, 175 S.E.2d 618 (1970), af§'d, 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E. 2d 393 (1971).
123. 277 N.C. at 596-97, 178 S.E.2d at 395-96.
124. Id. at 597, 178 S.E.2d at 396.
125. Id. at 599, 178 S.E.2d at 397.
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three distinct parcels, there was an apparent, continuous and perma-
nent dirt road used as a "quasi-easement," which would have given rise
to an easement by implication from prior use. Despite plaintiffs' alle-
gation that the road existed at the time of the severance, however, the
court's opinion reveals no evidence that the road actually had been in
continuous use before separation of title.'26 The court, therefore, was
forced to consider the implied easement issue exclusively on an ease-
ment by necessity theory.
In analyzing the case on this theory, the court made an error in its
discussion that did not affect the result in the case but does affect the
strength of the opinion as a statement of the operative rule. The court
described the elements of proof for an easement by necessity with a
citation to Smith v. Moore:
Furthermore, to establish the right to use the way of necessity, it is
not necessary to show absolute necessity. It is sufficient to show such
physical conditions and such use as would reasonably lead one to
believe that the grantor intended the grantee should have the right of
access.1
27
The court correctly stated that the basis for an easement by necessity is
the implementation of the inferred intention of the parties. 28 The
court's statement about the degree of necessity required to establish
such an easement, however, is the result of a significant distortion of
the language from which it is drawn in Smith v. Moore. Recall that
Smith v. Moore was decided solely on the basis of implication from
prior use. In its discussion of the prior use theory, the Smith court did
not purport to state the necessity requirement for the easement by ne-
cessity. 129 Oliver v. Ernul took language from Smith 30 expressly deal-
ing with the prior use theory and mistakenly applied it to the easement
by necessity.
If the preceding quotation from Oliver v. Ernul is compared with
the language in Smith v. Moore from which it is drawn, the only rea-
sonable conclusion is that, when Justice Huskins drafted Oliver v.
Ernul, he borrowed and modified language from Smith v. Moore. 3 '
Both the modification of the text and the difference in context, how-
ever, change the meaning of the language borrowed from Smith.
126. Id. at 593-96, 178 S.E.2d at 393-95.
127. Id. at 599, 178 S.E.2d at 397 (citing Smith v. Moore).
128. Id; accord, Carmon v. Dick, 170 N.C. 305, 87 S.E. 224 (1915).
129. See text accompanying notes 106-12 supra.
130. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
131. Compare text accompanying note 106 supra with text accompanying note 127 supra.
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While it might be true that to establish a right derived from necessity
alone a claimant need not show "absolute necessity," Smith v. Moore
does not support this position. The holding of Smith v. Moore is only
that the absolute necessity standard does not apply when it is shown
that there was prior use. Indeed, when Justice Huskins transplanted
the language from Smith v. Moore to Oliver v. Emul, he retained the
phrase "and such use" as an element of proof.132 Prior use was relevant
in Smith, but legally inconsequential in Oliver.
There was no real need for the Oliver court to decide on a verbal
formulation of the "extent of necessity" required in easement by neces-
sity cases. The facts of the case were such that, unless plaintiffs could
somehow have secured a crossing from the railroad to the north, the
only way in and out of their land was across the land of defendant. In
short, a right of way was essential or "absolutely necessary." This
makes it somewhat difficult to know just what the court intended in
Oliver. Perhaps the court feared that the evidence that plaintiffs did
drive across the tracks to the north made their necessity less than "ab-
solute." Whatever the verbal formula, the result seems correct. What
is troublesome is the court's use of a doctrinal description of "neces-
sity" in the easement by necessity context drawn from its earlier formu-
lation in connection with the prior use theory. If we are to take the
court at its word, 33 it apparently has overlooked the desirability of an
"extent of necessity" concept in implied easement law.
Perhaps the best explanation for the court's treatment of the im-
plied easement issue in Oliver is that it was sloppy in its use and under-
standing of its own precedent on a point that was not especially
important in the Oliver case itself. It is not clear that any appreciable
or irreparable harm has been done by the court's failure to define the
necessity requirement differently in connection with each of the two
types of implied easements. The result in Oliver v. Ernul is unexcep-
tionable on the facts. The court properly held that an easement by ne-
cessity was created when Ernul divided his property, thereby creating
two landlocked parcels with highway access available only over Ernul's
land. 134
Ultimately, however, a case will arise in which the supreme court's
132. Compare text accompanying note 106 supra with text accompanying note 127 supra.
133. The Oliver definition of "necessity" probably should not be taken literally. The court
was not required to engage in any real analysis of the necessity issue as it decided the case, and it
therefore seems unlikely that the language was chosen with the highest degree of care.
134. 277 N.C. at 593-96, 178 S.E.2d at 397-98.
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use of only one definition of "necessity" in both implied easement situ-
ations might make a difference in the outcome. 35 The court's opinions
to date provide no basis for understanding whether or how the court
expects trial judges to distinguish the meaning and application of the
necessity requirement in the case of an easement by necessity from the
meaning and application of that requirement in the case of an ease-
ment implied from prior use. Since Oliver, the court of appeals has
been asked to decide two implied easement cases. Each case required
more than a superficial look at the "extent of necessity" question. In
these cases the court accepted the "reasonable necessity" test in each of
the two implied easement contexts.
In Wilson v. Smith,136 the trial judge ruled that plaintiffs were enti-
tled to an easement by necessity across the land of defendant, and the
court of appeals affirmed. The Wilson court described a way of neces-
sity as an easement arising "when one grants a parcel of land sur-
rounded by his other land, or when the grantee has no access to it
except over the land retained by the grantor or land owned by a stran-
ger."'137 The court then quoted the language in Oliver v. Ernul derived
from Smith v. Moore.131 In short, the court said, on the one hand, that
a way of necessity arises when a grantee from common ownership has
"no access" but, on the other hand, following the language of Oliver,
said that it is "not necessary to show absolute necessity."' 139
Plaintiffs in Wilson had acquired their parcel from defendant and
claimed to have "no legally enforceable right-of-way to the public
highway."'" Evidence showed that plaintiffs did have a "permissive
right-of-way" to the highway across the lands of strangers. 4' Despite
this license, plaintiffs had no right that would guarantee their continued
ability to get to their land from the public road. The significance of this
state of affairs was demonstrated by plaintiffs' inability to obtain a
mortgage loan to finance the construction of a home on their property.
The court quite properly characterized plaintiffs' situation as one in
135. See note 38 supra. See also Carver v. Leatherwood, 230 N.C. 96, 52 S.E.2d 1 (1949): "As
there are substantial differences between the [easement by necessity and easement implied from
prior use], it might be well for plaintiffs to decide upon which right they rely. This would greatly
facilitate the trial and lessen the possibility of error." Id. at 98, 52 S.E.2d at 3.
136. 18 N.C. App. 414, 197 S.E.2d 23, cert. denied, 284 N.C. 125, 199 S.E.2d 664 (1973).
137. Id. at 414, 417, 197 S.E.2d at 23, 25 (emphasis added).
138. See text accompanying notes 106 & 127 supra.
139. 18 N.C. App. at 416, 417, 197 S.E.2d at 23, 25.
140. See id. at 418, 197 S.E.2d at 26.
141. Id. at 418, 197 S.E.2d at 26.
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which they "[did) not have full beneficial use of their property. ' 142
Wilson v. Smith is the paradigm for the proposition that the neces-
sity requirement for the easement by necessity cannot realistically be
defined as "strict" or "absolute" necessity. What the court must have
meant was that a way of necessity should be found in any circumstance
in which an estate in land is created by the separation of title previously
held by one person and in which that estate does not have, as an addi-
tional incident of ownership, a legally enforceable right, of greater dig-
nity than a license, of access to and from a public road that can be
exercised by reasonable means. In short, Wilson confirms the accuracy
of the Smith/Oliver statement that "absolute necessity" is not the test,
either in connection with an easement implied from prior use (Smnith)
or an easement by necessity (Oliver). On this basis it is not unreasona-
ble to argue that the extent of necessity requirement in the easement by
necessity case can be stated as that of "reasonable necessity." This con-
clusion, however, leaves the courts with the difficulty of defining the
necessity, requirement for the easement implied from prior use if, as is
proper, the "extent of necessity" required in that context should be dif-
ferent than in the context of the easement by necessity. 143
McGee v. McGee,1'4 a prior use theory case decided by the court of
appeals in 1977, suggests the not surprising conclusion that the North
Carolina courts will use "reasonable" as the modifying adjective in the
prior use theory cases. In McGee, the evidence showed that the claim-
ant had a means of access to his property in addition to the easement
claimed to be implied from prior use. The question raised on appeal
was whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the
claimed easement was "reasonably necessary to the full and fair enjoy-
ment of the land."'x45 This, of course, was the test stated in Smith v.
Moore and nearly all of the earlier prior use theory cases. Applying
this test, the McGee court held that the presence of the alternative right
of way to the plaintiff's property was not, in itself, conclusive proof that
the claimed easement was not "reasonably necessary.' 4 6
142. Id.
143. See text accompanying notes 47-51 infra.
144. 32 N.C. App. 726, 233 S.E.2d 675 (1977).
145. Id. at 728, 233 S.E.2d at 676.
146. "The presence of a second or alternate way onto the property is not conclusive proof that
an implied easement is unnecessary." .d. at 729, 233 S.E.2d at 677.
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III. AN ATTEMPT Ar DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION
The North Carolina implied easement cases indicate that the
North Carolina courts never have expressly accepted the notion that
implied easement law involves an "extent of necessity" concept in
which there is a difference in the "extent of necessity" required for cre-
ation of an implied easement with proof of prior use, on the one hand,
and when "necessity" alone supports the claim of the easement, on the
other. Indeed, the language of the opinions suggests that in North Car-
olina the required "extent of necessity" does not vary according to the
presence or absence of other factors from which the easement might be
implied. In all cases the stated test is a variation on the theme of "rea-
sonable necessity." 147
This probably does not represent a conscious judicial choice. It is
more likely that the relative simplicity of the cases appealed, and judi-
cial inattention to the significance of the language in the opinions, ac-
count for this situation. The problem, moreover, is not earthshaking.
There is little reason to predict that the supreme court and the court of
appeals are likely to make significant mistakes in deciding cases be-
cause of lack of clarity in the language of the existing implied easement
case law.
It is clear, however, that attorneys analyzing disputes and prepar-
ing litigation strategy, and trial judges testing the sufficiency of plead-
ings, ruling on questions of admissibility, and instructing juries, would
benefit from a clarification of the rule of necessity in implied easement
doctrine. There are several obvious steps the courts might take to im-
prove the statement of the doctrine.
The first would be to accept Professor Powell's suggestion that, in
a case in which there is evidence of prior use, the element of proof
related to the utility of the easement should be stated in terms of "im-
portance" rather than "necessity."' 48 This would leave the "reasonable
necessity" formulation available for the true easement by necessity sit-
uation. A rule formulation in terms of "importance" would help law-
yers, judges and juries focus on the ultimate issue in the quasi-easement
147. There is, however, support for the proposition that the North Carolina courts will depart
from the "reasonable necessity" formulation in a case in which the implied easement is claimed by
the grantor rather than by the grantee. In Goldstein v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 241 N.C. 583,
86 S.E.2d 84 (1955), the court said that implied easements would not be reserved in favor of a
grantor unless there is a showing of "strict or imperious necessity." Id. at 588, 86 S.E.2d at 87.
This position is not unique to the North Carolina courts. See, e.g., 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 3,
§§ 353, 362.
148. R. POWELL, supra note 2, 1 411; see text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
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case: is it likely the grantor and grantee intended to create the ease-
ment but neglected to document that intention?
While Professor Powell's suggestion seems to improve slightly the
description of the prior use theory doctrine and avoids duplicate use of
"reasonable necessity," it does little to clarify the profession's under-
standing of the easement by necessity. To accomplish that, the court
should return again to an explicit understanding of the easement by
necessity as a doctrine based on land utilization policy rather than ful-
fillment of inferred intent.' 49 This would require the North Carolina
courts to discard persistent but ultimately unimportant statements
about the doctrine. °50 It would, however, avoid the fiction that was lost
as the rule developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.'-" The
easement by necessity is recognized by the courts primarily to ensure
the beneficial use of land and thus to fulfill a social policy that is infer-
ior only to a policy of effectuating a clear expression of the parties that
they do not wish to create an easement in the course of a land transac-
tion. 152
If the easement by necessity were expressly based on public policy
and effected by operation of law, the courts could articulate the doc-
trine in terms more clearly satisfactory for most of the situations in
which the doctrine would be invoked. A claimant would be entitled to
an easement by necessity whenever the evidence showed that, as a re-
sult of separation of title, his land was left without an irrevocable right
of ingress and egress useful to him without extraordinary inconve-
nience and expense.'53 This probably is the law in North Carolina; the
rule, however, is stated in less concrete terms. We are told that the test
is not "absolute necessity" but, by implication, "reasonable necessity,"
the test also used in the prior use theory cases.
149. This suggestion is also, at least, implied in Professor Powell's treatise. See 3 R. POWELL,
supra note 2, 410.
150. See, e.g., Smith v. Moore, 254 N.C. 16, 118 S.E.2d 436 (1961); Carmon v. Dick, 170 N.C.
305, 87 S.E. 224 (1915).
151. See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
152. The generally accepted rule is that an express statement of an intention not to create an
easement will result in a judicial decision denying an easement by necessity even when the proof
would otherwise support the finding of an easement and even when the easement is recognized as
being based on public policy. E.g., 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 410 at 34-58 to -72; cf. RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476(b) & Comment d at 2977, 2980 (1944) (term in conveyance ex-
pressing intent not to create easement may prevent easement by necessity).
153. See, e.g., 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 410. The language of a rule applied to other types
of easements would, of course, vary from the text. The right of way is sufficiently common to have
resulted-at least in the North Carolina cases-in the terminology "way of necessity."
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It might be desirable to adopt both these suggestions. This would
leave the law roughly in the following position:
(A) Whenever the claimant shows a separation of title with no
right of access for the parcel conveyed, an easement by necessity would
be appropriate whether or not there was prior use of a claimed ease-
ment. Evidence of prior use might be useful in locating the easement 154
but would have no significant bearing on the decision to recognize the
easement.
(B) Whenever the evidence shows a separation of title but no prior
use and, in addition to the claimed easement, another similar right, use-
ful by the claimant without extraordinary inconvenience or expense, no
easement should be implied.
(C) Whenever the claimant shows a separation of title, an appar-
ent, continuous and permanent prior use, and another similar right use-
ful by the claimant without extraordinary inconvenience or expense, an
easement may be implied if the jury finds that the claimed easement is
so important to the use of the claimant's land that the importance, to-
gether with the proof of prior use and the parties' awareness of the
prior use, supports an inference that the parties intended to create the
easement. 15
5
These suggested doctrinal statements are concededly more cum-
bersome than the "reasonably necessary" or "necessary to the benefi-
cial use" language commonly used in the North Carolina opinions.
Doctrinal clarity and precision, however, are not always achieved by
the use of apparently simple statements that have a way of becoming
judicial cliches.' 56 If, as suggested in Smith v. Moore and McGee v.
McGee, the existence of an alternative right of access is not an impedi-
ment to a jury finding of "reasonable necessity," and if the supreme
court seriously intends to follow the suggestion of Oliver v. Ernul that
"reasonable necessity" is the test even in the easement by necessity
154. The North Carolina courts follow the rule that the right to choose the location of a way of
necessity belongs, in the first instance, to the owner of the claimed servient estate, provided, how-
ever, that the right is exercised in a "reasonable manner." Eg., Pritchard v. Scott, 254 N.C. 277,
283, 118 S.E.2d 890, 895 (1961); Winston Brick Mfg. Co. v. Hodgin, 190 N.C. 582, 585, 130 S.E.
330, 331 (1925).
155. See generally McGee v. McGee, 32 N.C. App. 726, 233 S.E.2d 675 (1977); Dorman v.
Wayah Valley Ranch, Inc., 6 N.C. App. 497, 170 S.E.2d 509 (1969).
156. North Carolina Civil Pattern Jury Instruction § 840.25, designed for use in the easement
by necessity case, uses neither "necessity" nor "necessary" in defining the proof that is sufficient to
imply that type of easement. Instead the instruction requires the jury to find that plaintiff has
proved the absence of a "legally enforceable right of access to a public road." See NORTH CARO-
LINA CONFERENCE OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES, COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES § 840.25 (Supp. 1979).
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case, it is at least theoretically possible in North Carolina for a "prop-
erly" instructed jury to imply an easement without proof of prior use
and in the face of proof of another right of access. If, as one must
strongly suspect, this is not the law of North Carolina, it is both abso-
lutely and reasonably necessary for the North Carolina courts to break
away from the simplistic patterns of doctrinal description that have
crept into the implied easement cases. The courts instead should use
more precise, albeit more complex, statements of the law that expressly
reflect the "extent of necessity" concept in implied easement law.
